

This is a very strong paper, fluent in its analysis and exceptionally well informed. You draw on the reading in selective and effective fashion. You deploy a sophisticated array of concepts - sometimes they come a bit thick and fast - that provide you with analytical power. Basically you are persuasive in presenting the Philippine case as exceptional. I am not entirely sure I agree about all your reasons why, although generally you argue persuasively. Hawai'i does appear to be the fly in the ointment here. The difference in distance from the continental US between Hawai'i and Philippines appears an arbitrary basis for the different histories. I do think the presence of a substantial white US settler population in Hawai'i - as well as a tangible economic interest in plantation agriculture there - are salient. These factors were absent from the Philippines, where the US seized control as an ancillary strategic move in the war to dislodge Spain from Cuba and assert US control there. Then McKinley found he couldn't bring himself to give up the Philippines and he found public support at home for keeping it. Incidentally, the US didn't agree to give up formal control there only in 1946 - that commitment came earlier, which shows a waning US interest in direct rule definitely by the 1930s, possibly even earlier. You are correct about the Roman model for the continental conquests, and the application of new models for overseas US power. I am not convinced the US allowed greater self-rule in Cuba than in the Philippines because US leaders saw Cubans as more fit to rule themselves. The Platt Amendment expressed strong reservations on that count, and seems merely a different, less expensive method of maintaining what you accurately call suzerainty. But these are quibbles. This is fundamentally a fine paper, which I greatly enjoyed reading.

Approved